



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

**REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO THE
MISSING OPERATOR OF THE RECREATIONAL
VESSEL BIG STICK (O.N. 1337362) ON APRIL 6,
2024**



U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard

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16732/IIA #7895450
27 March 2026

**MAN OVERBOARD RESULTING IN THE PRESUMED LOSS OF ONE LIFE FROM
THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL BIG STICK (O.N. 1337362) NEAR OAK ISLAND,
NORTH CAROLINA ON APRIL 6, 2024**

ACTION BY THE COMMANDANT

The record and the report of investigation completed for this marine casualty have been reviewed by the Office of Investigations & Casualty Analysis. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analyses, and conclusions are approved. This marine casualty investigation is closed.



E. B. SAMMS
Captain, U. S. Coast Guard
Office of Investigations and Casualty Analysis (CG-INV)



16732
March 16, 2026

**MISSING OPERATOR OF THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL BIG STICK
(O.N. 1337362) ON APRIL 6, 2024.**


ENDORSEMENT BY THE COMMANDER, COAST GUARD EAST DISTRICT

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

ENDORSEMENT ON RECOMMENDATIONS

Administrative Recommendation 8.2. Recommend this investigation be closed.

Endorsement: Concur. The Coast Guard East District agrees with the analysis and conclusions of the Investigating Officer and the endorsement of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection. No further action is required by the Coast Guard.



MATTHEW J. MESKUN
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard Chief,
Prevention Division

Enclosures: (1) Endorsement by the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection
(2) Executive Summary
(3) Investigating Officer's Report

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



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16732
26 Jan 2026


**MISSING OPERATOR OF THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL BIG STICK (O.N. 1337362)
ON APRIL 6, 2024**

ENDORSEMENT BY THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, MARINE INSPECTION

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved subject to the following comments. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. I offer my sincere condolences to the family and friends of the operator who lost his life.



Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection

Enclosures: (1) Executive Summary
(2) Investigating Officer's Report



16732
26 Jan 2026

MISSING OPERATOR OF THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL BIG STICK (O.N. 1337362) ON APRIL 6, 2024

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 6, 2024, the operator of the 32-foot recreational vessel **BIG STICK** was staying at a vacation rental home in Oak Island, NC, with his wife, two children, and father. Earlier that morning, the operator consumed alcohol and later had an argument with his wife. Around noon, his wife decided to leave the vacation home with their children, prompting the operator to embark on a solo fishing trip, stating that he needed time to think. Despite being an experienced fisherman and boat operator, the operator had a history of heart problems, including two prior heart attacks, and struggled with heavy drinking.

At approximately 1530 EDT, the operator launched **BIG STICK** with assistance from his father, who observed that his son appeared to have consumed alcohol but did not seem impaired. The operator declined his father's offer to join him, stating they would fish together the following morning. While underway, the operator contacted his father to discuss fishing locations and later called his wife. During the call, he reassured her that he was fishing alone and expressed his love. After this conversation, the operator did not respond to subsequent calls from his family and made no further attempts to contact them. He continued toward his offshore fishing location.

At approximately 2220 EDT, the operator's son reported him missing to the U.S. Coast Guard Station Oak Island, expressing concerns about his father's medical condition and distraught state of mind. The Coast Guard initiated a search operation, deploying multiple assets, including aircraft, small boats, and the cutter **CGC STEELHEAD**, covering over 5,863 square miles. Despite extensive efforts, the operator was not located, and the search was suspended on April 8, 2024.

On April 9, 2024, the commercial fishing vessel **HORSE** discovered **BIG STICK** approximately 72 nautical miles southeast of Wrightsville Beach, NC, with its engines idling and no occupants aboard. A boarding team from the **USS FORREST SHERMAN** inspected the vessel and found the engines running, a cellular phone mounted and charging, ten personal flotation devices stowed, and dead fish in the aft fish box. After confirming no one was aboard, the vessel was recovered by Sea Tow and returned to Wrightsville Beach.

Coast Guard assets resumed the search for the operator, covering an additional 2,967 square miles. The operator was never found, and the search was suspended on April 10, 2024. The operator of **BIG STICK** was presumed dead.

As a result of this investigation, the Coast Guard has determined that the operator of BIG STICK fell overboard into the ocean, which constitutes the initiating event for this casualty. The operator's body was never seen or recovered and was presumed dead. The casual factors that contributed to this casualty include: (1) the operator's decision to boat alone, (2) the suspected role of alcohol on operator, (3) the operator not wearing a personal flotation device, (4) the vessel condition and fishing activity, (5) the operator did not carry the ACR ResQLink personal locator beacon, (6) the impact of engine kill switch non-engagement on operator safety, and (7) the impact of overwritten navigation data on search and incident reconstruction.



16732
26 Jan 2026

**MISSING OPERATOR OF THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL BIG STICK (O.N. 1337362)
ON APRIL 6, 2024**

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

1. Preliminary Statement

1.1. This marine casualty investigation was conducted, and this report was submitted in accordance with Title 46, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Subpart 4.07, and under the authority of Title 46, United States Code (USC) Chapter 63.

1.2. There were no parties-in-interest designated for this investigation.

1.3. The Coast Guard was the lead agency for all evidence collection activities involving this investigation. No other persons or organizations assisted in the investigation.

1.4. All times listed in this report are in Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) using a 24-hour format and are approximate.

2. Vessel Involved in the Incident



Figure 1: Photograph of the BIG STICK taken by the master of the Fishing Vessel HORSE on April 9, 2024.

Official Name:	BIG STICK
Identification Number:	Official Number 1337362
Flag:	United States
Vessel Class/Type/Sub-Type	Recreational / General
Build Year:	2023
Gross Tonnage:	10 GT
Length:	31.7 Feet
Beam/Width:	9.1 Feet
Draft/Depth:	5.6 Feet
Main/Primary Propulsion:	Twin 350 Horsepower Outboard Engines
Operator:	Jeffrey Lewis Kale Lake Wylie, NC
Owner:	[REDACTED]

3. Deceased, Missing, and/or Injured Persons

Relationship to Vessel	Sex	Age	Status
Operator	Male	46	Missing and Presumed Deceased

4. Findings of Fact

4.1. The Incident:

4.1.1. On the morning of April 6, 2024, the operator of BIG STICK consumed an unspecified amount of alcohol and engaged in a verbal argument with his wife at a vacation rental in Oak Island, NC.

4.1.2. On April 6, 2024, at 1530, the operator and his father drove to the Wildlife Ramp in Southport, NC, where they launched BIG STICK.

4.1.3. While launching the boat, the operator told his father that he intended to fish alone, as they had planned to fish together the following morning.

4.1.4. The father observed that his son appeared to have consumed some alcohol but did not seem intoxicated, as he was able to drive the truck to the boat ramp and back the trailer without issue.

4.1.5. BIG STICK departed from the boat ramp with only the operator on board, who intended to fish at an unspecified location 48 nautical miles offshore.

4.1.6. At 1541, while proceeding to the fishing spot, the operator called his father to discuss potential fishing locations. Shortly afterward, he placed a call to his wife, who informed him that she and the children were heading back to their home in South Carolina and asked him to return. Before ending the call, the operator reassured her that he was fishing alone and expressed his love. Following this conversation, attempts by

his wife and 15-year-old son to contact the operator were unsuccessful, and he did not initiate any further communication with his family.

4.1.7. At 1622, the operator piloted BIG STICK at a speed of 44 miles per hour, heading away from shore.

4.1.8. At 2220, the operator's son contacted U.S. Coast Guard Station Oak Island to report that his father was overdue. Station Oak Island promptly relayed the report to the Sector North Carolina Command Center.

4.1.9. At 2308, the operator's father contacted Sector North Carolina Command Center and provided details about the vessel's description and intended fishing location.

4.1.10. On April 7, 2024, at 0029, the Oak Island Police Department checked the operator's vacation rental at Oak Island, NC, where the operator's father was present along with a black pickup truck and an empty boat trailer, confirming the operator's absence and that the vessel had not returned to the property.

4.1.11. At 0116, CGR-2015, a Coast Guard HC-130J launched from Air Station Elizabeth City to search for BIG STICK.

4.1.12. At 0300, CGR-2015 initiated a parallel search pattern at the Blackjack Hole fishing grounds, located approximately 48 miles south southeast of Bald Head Island.

4.1.13. At 0449, CGR-2015 completed its search with no sightings reported and returned to Air Station Elizabeth City.

4.1.14. At 1342, CGR-2015 launched from Air Station Elizabeth City to continue the search.

4.1.15. At 1410, CGR-2015 resumed its parallel search in the vicinity of the Blackjack Hole fishing grounds.

4.1.16. At 1435, the Coast Guard 87-foot patrol boat, CGC STEELHEAD, began a parallel search southeast of the Blackjack Hole fishing grounds.

4.1.17. At 1520, CGR-2015 completed its search with no sightings reported and returned to Air Station Elizabeth City.

4.1.18. At 1530, the Coast Guard rescue boat CG-29209 (Station Oak Island) conducted a search of local marinas and inlets, including Morning Star Marina and Safe Harbor Marina. This shoreline search covered a total of 10 locations.

4.1.19. At 1615, CGR-2013, a Coast Guard C-130 launched from Air Station Elizabeth City to search for BIG STICK in the vicinity of the Winyah fishing grounds but had to return to base due to a gear malfunction.

4.1.20. At 2200, CG-29209 completed its search of local marinas without locating BIG STICK.

4.1.21. On April 8, 2024, at 0602, the Coast Guard rescue boat CG-29218 (Station Wrightsville Beach) conducted a search of local marinas, including Carolina Beach State Park and Masonboro Inlet without locating BIG STICK.

4.1.22. At 0625, CGR-2015 launched from Air Station Elizabeth City.

4.1.23. At 0629, CGC STEELHEAD began trackline searches between the offshore fishing grounds, Bald Head Island, and the Gary Ennis reef.

4.1.24. At 0656, CGR-2015 arrived on scene and commenced its search.

4.1.25. At 1028, the Coast Guard auxiliary boat 27739 (Station Wrightsville Beach) conducted a search of local waterways within the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway but did not locate BIG STICK.

4.1.26. At 1055, CGR-2015 completed three separate searches approximately 50 miles south of Wilmington, NC, but did not locate BIG STICK.

4.1.27. At 2120, CGC STEELHEAD completed its assigned search pattern and returned to port in Fort Macon, NC.

4.1.28. At 2220, the Coast Guard suspended the search for BIG STICK, pending further developments. The search duration exceeded both estimated probability of survival time (44 hours) and the median survival time (30 hours). Although the vessel was equipped with a personal locator beacon, no signals have been received. At this point, nine search efforts had been conducted, covering a total of 5,863 square miles over 72 hours.




Figure 2: Screenshot showing the location of BIG STICK (marked with an X) as spotted by the fishing vessel HORSE on April 9, 2024, in proximity to the Blackjack Hole fishing grounds.

4.1.29. On April 9, 2024, at 0927, the commercial fishing vessel HORSE spotted the unmanned BIG STICK approximately 86 miles from Southport, NC.

4.1.30. BIG STICK was found underway, heading north-northeast with its engine engaged, moving at approximately five knots.

4.1.31. BIG STICK's port outrigger was deployed, while the starboard outrigger was stowed. A bent-butt Electro-Mate rod equipped with a planer (a device used to keep bait or lures running deeper in the water) was set on the port side. Three additional fishing rods were positioned in the stern rod holders, though no lines were in the water at the time. A fishing leader with bait remnants was also found near the transom, further indicating the vessel was set up for trolling.

4.1.32. Due to the rough seas, the crew of HORSE was unable to board BIG STICK.

4.1.33. The crew of HORSE relayed BIG STICK's position to a contact at Seapath Yacht Club in Wrightsville Beach, NC, who subsequently reached out to the Coast Guard and Sea Tow for assistance.

4.1.34. At 0944, after locating BIG STICK, Sector North Carolina resumed the search, redirecting efforts to locate the missing operator.

4.1.35. At 1011, Sea Tow (Wrightsville Beach) dispatched the SEA TOW 8 to recover BIG STICK.

4.1.36. At 1211, USS SHERMAN arrived near BIG STICK and deployed a boarding team to investigate.



Figure 3: Boarding team from USS SHERMAN conducting investigation aboard BIG STICK.

4.1.37. BIG STICK was found with its engines in gear before the boarding team shifted them to neutral and powered them down.

4.1.38. BIG STICK had the boat keys in the ignition. The operator's cell phone was mounted on the console and connected to a charger. No wallet or additional keys were located.

4.1.39. Ten life jackets were discovered in various compartments located in the forward section of the vessel.

4.1.40. Fish were found in the aft fish box by the transom. Four fishing rods were positioned on the gunwales, while three were secured in rod holders on the hardtop. Additionally fishing gear was stored in various compartments within the console and leaning post. The port side planner rod remained in place.

4.1.41. A single whip-type antenna on the starboard side of the hardtop was folded down. A SIMRAD radar and what appeared to be a FLIR were mounted on the forward part of the hardtop. The two outriggers were mounted to the hardtop and folded down. Charter plotter data was incomplete, not showing the boat's port of origin and only going back several hours.



Figure 4: Photograph of the BIG STICK's port side outrigger partially deployed, taken by the boarding team from the USS SHERMAN on April 9, 2024.

4.1.42. At 1325, CGR-2016, a Coast Guard C-130 launched from Air Station Elizabeth City.

4.1.43. At 1416, CGR-2016 arrived on scene and commenced a six-hour parallel search.

4.1.44. At 1514, CGR-2016 established radio communications with SEA TOW 8 and directed them to BIG STICK.

4.1.45. At 1514, SEA TOW 8 arrived on scene, approximately 92 nautical miles off Masonboro Inlet.

4.1.46. At 1515, SEA TOW 8 crew found BIG STICK with the starboard engine throttle engaged in forward, though the engines were off. Fuel remained in the tanks, and fishing gear was partially deployed.

4.1.47. At 1633, SEA TOW 8 captain provided track line data to the Coast Guard Sector North Carolina Command Center to assist in revising the search areas.

4.1.48. At 2000, BIG STICK was towed to Wrightsville Beach by Sea Tow 8 and subsequently moored at the dock.

4.1.49. At 2000, Sector North Carolina Investigating Officers examined BIG STICK and noted the following observations: Fishing gear was partially deployed, and lifesaving gear was stowed. The operator's cell phone, found on board, showed the last outgoing call to his wife at 1542 on April 6, 2024, followed by missed calls from his wife and son. Chart plotter data recorded a position at 1540 on April 6, 2024, but no route history for the day. Activity track history ended at 1340 on April 6, 2024, at 32.62339° N, 77.19789° W. Engine alarm readouts indicated multiple instances of engine rev limits being raised and cleared, with the last alarm recorded at 1448 on April 6, 2024.

4.1.50. At 2126, CGC STEELHEAD began a parallel search pattern in the vicinity where BIG STICK was discovered.

4.1.51. On April 10, 2024, at 0833, CGR-2013 launched from Air Station Elizabeth City.

4.1.52. At 0929, CGR-2013 commenced a parallel search for the operator of the BIG STICK.

4.1.53. At 1120, CGR-2013 was re-tasked to a parallel search north of the previous search area.

4.1.54. At 1439, CGR-2013 ended its search after covering 80% of the planned search area due to deteriorating weather conditions.

4.1.55. At 2015, CGC STEELHEAD completed three visual parallel searches for the operator of BIG STICK.

4.1.56. At 2015, Coast Guard Sector North Carolina, with concurrence from the Coast Guard East District, suspended the search for the operator after completing six searches over 27 hours, covering 2,967 square miles. Including all efforts for both the vessel and the missing Operator, a total of 15 searches were conducted over 99 hours, covering 8,830 square miles. The missing Operator was not located and is presumed dead.




Figure 5: Overlay of search patterns conducted by search and rescue assets, compiled using the U.S. Coast Guard SAROPS program.

4.2 Additional/Supporting Information:

4.2.1. The operator, with extensive experience as both a fisherman and boat operator, had been engaged in fishing activities since childhood and typically boated with companions.

4.2.2. The operator had a history of heart problems, including two previous heart attacks, and was on medication to manage his condition. Additionally, interviews with his father and wife indicated that he struggled with heavy alcohol consumption.

4.2.3. Key safety equipment on board BIG STICK after the vessel was located and moored included ten personal flotation devices (PFDs) and an ACR ResQLink personal locator beacon (PLB). The vessel was also equipped with an engine kill switch, also known as a 'dead man switch' (shown on Figure 6).

4.2.4. In videos posted to Facebook on April 6, 2024, the operator is clearly seen not wearing a PFD and without the engine kill switch lanyard attached. Upon recovery of the vessel on April 9, 2024, there was no indication that a PFD had been in use. The ACR ResQLink (PLB) was found stowed on the vessel, and the engine kill switch lanyard was attached to the engine kill switch.

4.2.5. Weather conditions at the time of the operator departure from Southport, NC at 1530 on April 6, 2024, were: winds 10-15 knots, seas 4–6-feet, visibility approximately 10 nautical miles, air temperature 62° Fahrenheit, and the water temperature 63° Fahrenheit.

4.2.6. Offshore weather conditions at 1200 on April 7, 2024, in the general search area, approximately 90 miles from Southport: 10-25 knot winds from the northeast, 4–5-foot seas, and 10 nautical mile visibility.

4.2.7. The following weather conditions were reported at 1500 on April 8, 2024, in the search area as recorded by NOAA buoys in Frying Pan Shoals: Winds of 8-15 knots from the southwest, seas of 2 feet, and 10 nautical mile visibility.

4.2.8. BIG STICK's SIMRAD EVO3 navigation system automatically overwrites older track line data unless manually saved. After the incident, the vessel's electrical systems remained powered, causing new data to overwrite previous track lines from the period following the operator's presumed entry into the water. This loss of location data limited investigators' ability to reconstruct the vessel's movements and hindered search and recovery efforts. While the navigation system did not directly contribute to the operator's disappearance, the absence of this data reduced the availability of potentially critical information.

5. Analysis

5.1. **Operator's Decision to Boat Alone:** The operator, who was typically known to boat with companions, chose to embark on this trip alone, declining his father's offer to accompany him. Boating alone inherently limits the availability of immediate assistance during emergencies, such as accidents, medical issues, or equipment failures, as there is no one else present to provide aid. Solo operations also require the individual to manage all operational tasks independently, increasing the risk of fatigue and reducing situational awareness, which can further elevate the likelihood of an incident. Had the operator been accompanied, a second person could have promptly notified authorities or initiated a rescue attempt, significantly improving the operator's chances of survival.

5.2. **Suspected Role of Alcohol on Operator:** The operator had consumed an unspecified quantity of alcoholic beverages before getting underway on the morning of the incident. While no alcoholic containers were found on the vessel, it is unknown whether the operator continued drinking after launching the boat. His level of intoxication at the time of the incident remains undetermined. Nonetheless, alcohol is widely recognized to impair judgment, motor skills, coordination, and balance, which are critical abilities for safe vessel operation. Even moderate alcohol consumption can amplify the effects of fatigue, dehydration, and environmental factors such as sun exposure and wave motion, which are common in boating activities. In this case, the operator's earlier alcohol consumption may have reduced his ability to respond effectively to challenges, increasing the likelihood of a fall overboard.

5.3. **Operator Not Wearing a PFD:** There were no witness accounts of the operator's disappearance aboard BIG STICK on April 6, 2024, and the exact circumstances and timing of his entry into the water remain unknown. When the vessel was recovered, ten PFDs were

found stowed in a compartment. It is not known how many PFDs were originally on board prior to getting underway. No PFD was found in use, which suggests the operator was not wearing one at the time of the incident. The lack of wearing a PFD, coupled with the operator's known medical condition, would have significantly diminished his likelihood of survival, regardless of when he entered the water. While it is unclear whether additional health issues or injuries further impacted his chances, wearing a PFD would have likely increased his buoyancy and visibility, potentially prolonging survival time and improving the likelihood of detection by search and rescue personnel, especially in challenging sea conditions.

5.4. Vessel Condition and Fishing Activity: When the BIG STICK was recovered, the port outrigger was deployed, the starboard outrigger remained stowed, a port-side planer rod was in place, and three additional rods were secured in holders, with no lines in the water. The aft fish box contained fish, indicating the operator had been actively engaged in fishing prior to the incident. While the vessel's outriggers can be deployed from the deck using a spinning handle, reducing the need to climb onto the gunwale, it remains possible the operator accessed the gunwale for other reasons, such as adjusting the outrigger, handling fishing gear, or addressing an issue. Frequent movement around the deck during fishing activities, combined with vessel motion and potentially wet surfaces, could have increased the risk of losing balance and falling overboard.

5.5. Operator Did Not Carry the ACR ResQLink PLB: BIG STICK was equipped with an ACR ResQLink PLB, which was found stowed in a compartment above the console. The ACR ResQLink is designed to transmit a distress signal using GPS positioning, a 406 MHz satellite signal, and a 121.5 MHz homing capability. These signals relay the distress information to satellites, which then transmit it to ground stations and appropriate search and rescue authorities. While the PLB is waterproof and capable of providing an accurate location to aid rescue efforts, it requires manual activation and must be accessible during emergencies. Had the operator been carrying the PLB on his person, such as in a pocket or attached to a life jacket, it could have remained accessible during an unexpected entry into the water, potentially enabling faster and more accurate location for search and rescue teams.



Figure 6: Photograph of the ACR ResQLink personal locator beacon found on the BIG STICK. Taken by U.S. Coast Guard Sector North Carolina Investigators on April 9, 2024.

5.6. Impact of Engine Kill Switch Non-Engagement on Operator Safety: The vessel was equipped with a lanyard-style engine kill switch, a safety feature designed to immediately shut off the engine if the operator is separated from the helm. When activated, the kill switch stops the vessel's forward motion by disconnecting the lanyard from the switch. Upon recovery of the vessel, the kill switch lanyard was found attached to the engine kill switch, indicating the system had not been engaged. Had the operator been wearing the lanyard at the time of an overboard incident, the system would have activated, shutting off the engine and reducing the vessel's forward momentum. In ideal circumstances, this could have prevented the vessel from moving away from the operator, thereby increasing the likelihood of self-rescue or timely recovery.



Figure 7: Photograph of the console of the BIG STICK, showing the lanyard-style engine kill switch to the right of the steering wheel. Captured by the USS SHERMAN boarding team on April 9, 2024.

5. Conclusions

6.1. Determination of Cause:

6.1.1. The initiating event for this casualty was the operator going overboard. Causal factors leading to this event include:

6.1.1.1. The operator's decision to embark on a solo fishing trip.

6.1.1.2. The operator being under the influence of alcohol prior to departing from the boat ramp.

6.1.2. Following the operator's disappearance overboard, he was deemed missing and presumed dead.

6.1.2.1. The operator was not wearing a personal flotation device.

6.1.2.2. The operator did not carry the ACR ResQLink PLB on his person while underway.

6.1.2.3. Vessel Condition and Arrangement for Fishing Activity.

6.1.2.4. The engine kill switch was not used properly, as the lanyard was attached to the switch and not worn by the operator.

6.2. Evidence of Act(s) or Violation(s) of Law by Any Coast Guard Credentialed Mariner Subject to Action Under 46 USC Chapter 77: There were no acts of misconduct, incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or violations of law by a credentialed mariner identified as part of this investigation.

6.3. Evidence of Act(s) or Violation(s) of Law by U.S. Coast Guard Personnel, or any other person: There were no acts of misconduct, incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or violations of law by Coast Guard employees or any other person that contributed to this casualty.

6.4. Evidence of Act(s) Subject to Civil Penalty: This investigation did not identify violations subject to Civil Penalty.

6.5. Evidence of Criminal Act(s): This investigation did not identify violations of criminal law.

6.6. Need for New or Amended U.S. Law or Regulation: This investigation identified no matters needing new or amended U.S. law or regulation.

6.7. Unsafe Actions or Conditions that Were Not Causal Factors:

6.7.1. This investigation did not identify evidence of any unsafe actions or conditions that were not causal factors.

7. Actions Taken Since the Incident

7.1. There have been no actions taken since the incident.


8. Recommendations

8.1. Safety Recommendation:

8.1.1. There were no proposed actions to add new or amend existing U.S. laws or regulations, international requirements, industry standards, or U.S. Coast Guard policies and procedures as part of this investigation.

8.2. Administrative Recommendations:

8.2.1. Recommend this investigation be closed.



Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Coast Guard
Investigating Officer